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A B S T R A C T
There is little information to decision support in air traﬃc management in case of nuclear releases into the
atmosphere. In this paper, the dose estimation due to both, external exposure (i.e. cloud immersion, deposition
inside and outside the aircraft), and due to internal exposure (i.e, inhalation of radionuclides inside the aircraft)
to passengers and crew is calculated for a worst-case emergency scenario. The doses are calculated for diﬀerent
radionuclides and activities. Calculations are mainly considered according to International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) recommendations and Monte Carlo simulations. In addition, a discussion on
potential detectors installed inside the aircraft for monitoring the aerosol concentration and the ambient dose
equivalent rate, H*(10), for during-ﬂight monitoring and early warning is provided together with the evaluation
of a response of a generic detector. The results show that the probability that a catastrophic nuclear accident
would produce signiﬁcant radiological doses to the passengers and crew of an aircraft is very low. In the worst-
case scenarios studied, the maximum estimated eﬀective dose was about 1mSv during take-oﬀ or landing op-
erations, which is the recommended yearly threshold for the public. However, in order to follow the ALARA (As
Low As Reasonably Achievable) criteria and to avoid aircraft contamination, the installation of radiological
detectors is considered. This would, on one hand help the pilot or corresponding decision maker to decide about
the potential change of the route and, on the other, allow for gathering of 4D data for future studies.
1. Introduction
The project European Natural Airborne Disaster Information and
Coordination System for Aviation (EUNADICS-AV, 2016–2019, www.
eunadics.eu) undertakes to develop and test a unique system to provide
consistent and coherent information to aviation authorities, airlines and
pilots in the event of a disaster aﬀecting the airspace, including nuclear
airborne emissions. EUNADICS-AV aims at bridging the gap between
the data and the actual decision process. For natural disasters such as
volcanic eruptions, there are regulations and guidelines, like those
compiled on the website of EASA (https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-
and-you/safety-management/volcanic-ash) that assist the decision-
making process, from air traﬃc management to the actual pilots. That is
not the case in radiological emergencies, where signiﬁcantly less gui-
dance is available, like that compiled in the EASA Safety Information
Bulletin SIB 2011–4 (EASA, 2011).
During events with release of nuclear material, like what happened
in Fukushima, experience has shown that very little practical guidance
is available to aviation and to pilots. The relevant ICAO (International
Civil Aviation Organization) Annex 3, Meteorological Service for
International Air Navigation (ICAO, 2016a), foresees the inclusion of a
nuclear symbol in signiﬁcant weather chart to indicate the location of
the source, a text message which describes the extent of the cloud. In
the future, when detailed information on the release is not available a
radius of up to 30 km may be used, in addition to a vertical extent from
the surface to the upper limit of the applicable airspace (ICAO, 2016b).
Evaluation of a crisis management exercise conducted by
Eurocontrol in 2014 resulted in a long list of items required to better
prepare for the future, most prominent being the issuance of charts that
show the spread of radioactivity in the air at commonly used ﬂight
altitudes. At present, no such charts are available to air traﬃc control,
airlines or pilots (ICAO, 2016b).
In case of a radiological emergency, for example as a result of a
severe nuclear power plant accident or a nuclear weapon detonation,
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with a signiﬁcant release into the atmosphere, en-route ﬂights or
taking-oﬀ/landing aircrafts can encounter the emitted radioactive
cloud and ﬂy through it without noticing it, as there are no radiation
detectors on commercial aircrafts. This could pose a health risk to both
passengers and crew. In such an event, the exposure pathways can be
either through cloud- and ground-shine from external gamma photons
or directly by internal contamination through inhalation. From an op-
erations perspective, the doses can be calculated in two diﬀerent ﬂight
situations: the aircraft is outside the cloud or the aircraft is inside the
cloud. In the ﬁrst case, the contribution to the dose is only due to the
external exposure due to the photons from the radioactive cloud that
will deposit energy into individuals in the aircraft. If, on the contrary,
the aircraft is inside the cloud or passes through it, the dose contribu-
tions will be due to: a) external dose from the cloud outside and inside
the aircraft, b) external dose from deposited radioactive particles in
both outside and inside the aircraft surfaces, and c) internal doses due
to inhalation of the radioactive aerosol. The ingestion pathway is ne-
glected in both situations.
Besides the radiological risk to the human beings in the vessel, an
aircraft intersecting a radioactive cloud will become contaminated and
a decontamination process, under a regulated procedure, should
therefore follow after landing preventing the aircraft to be used until it
is declared as “non-radiologically contaminated”. Although the eco-
nomic impact of such a contamination may be signiﬁcant or even cri-
tical for some small ﬂight companies, it is not within the scope of this
paper to make an economic assessment.
In addition to making a ﬁrst assessment of the doses that could be
reached either based on uncertain forecasts or after-ﬂight, a preventive
or early-warning approach could be taken by introducing radiological
monitoring devices into the planes so that the basic criteria in radi-
ological protection of “as low as reasonable achievable” (ALARA) could
be achieved based on decisions on the ﬂy. An initial step of under-
standing the response of detectors to measure the radiological risk is
therefore needed and addressed in this work. It is worth noting that
such detectors could as well provide, not only the radiological dose but
also potentially distinguish whether the aircraft is inside the cloud or if
it is approaching to the cloud and thus allow for a rerouting possibility.
Finally, unlike in other types of hazards, there is a general lack of
measurement data for radionuclide emissions in upper layers of the
atmosphere since automatic and non-automatic systems are located at
ground level, where the population resides. Having monitors installed
in aircrafts would provide crucial information to develop further any
guidelines or recommendations to support pilots to take decisions.
2. Methodology
2.1. Radionuclides selection
A large number of radionuclides are present in case of a radiological
accident in a nuclear power plant or after a nuclear explosion. In order
to constrain the radionuclides to a feasible number, a dose-based ap-
proach is taken. In this approach, the radionuclides selected were the
most contributing to the internal and external dose in case of a NPP
accident such as Fukushima and Chernobyl (this value is corroborated
by internal EUNADICS-AV studies performed by the Radiation and
Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland, STUK). Table 1 shows the list of
radionuclides used in the follow-up dose calculations and their main
radioactive characteristics.
2.2. Calculation of activity concentration inside the aircraft and activity
deposited on the vessel walls
The temporal evolution of the volumetric activity inside the aircraft
can be calculated with the following equation (Eq. (1)):
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where.
Ci is the volumetric activity of radionuclide i inside the aircraft in Bq
m−3, Co is the volumetric activity of radionuclide i outside the aircraft
in Bq m−3, Qfresh is the air renewal ﬂow rate of the aircraft (fresh air) in
m3 h−1, Qrec is the air recirculation ﬂow rate of the aircraft in m3 h−1, V
is the volume of the aircraft in m3, λ is the decay constant of the
radionuclide in h−1, Xd is the deposition rate of the radionuclide par-
ticles in h−1, εfresh is the eﬃciency of the entrance ﬁlter, i.e, for the
fresh air, and εrec is the eﬃciency of the recirculation ﬁlter.
To estimate the internal dose (i.e. due to inhalation), only the re-
levant sub-set of the selected radionuclides is used. This includes 134Cs,
137Cs, 131I, 132Te and 132I. For 134Cs, 137Cs, 131I and 132Te the activities
of the progenitor concentration are zero, Ci-1= 0. In addition, 132I ac-
tivity is considered to be in equilibrium with 132Te.
Air renewal and ﬁltering is of course a crucial aspect. The European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) indicates that each passenger and crew
compartment must be ventilated with enough fresh air but not less than
0.3 m3min−1 STP (Standard Temperature and Pressure. This renewal is
achieved through circulation inside the cabin (Fig. 1) until eventually
the air is drawn into the lower fuselage, where approximately half of it
is vented overboard through a pressurization outﬂow valve. The re-
maining portion is remixed with a fresh supply from the engines and
run through High Eﬃciency Particulate Air (HEPA) ﬁlters. Then the
cycle begins again.
As example, with a minimal renewal of 5 L/s per person in an Airbus
A320-200 and 160 passengers on board the plane with a cabin volume
of 330m3, leads to an air renewal of 2.5min.
According to Fig. 1, εfres is set to 0 since there is no ﬁlter for the fresh
air but only for the recirculating air. The value for εrec for HEPA ﬁlter is
about 99% for particulate matter. It should be taken into consideration
that, for noble gases and Iodine in gaseous form, the retention eﬃciency
of the HEPA ﬁlter would only be granted if an activated carbon ﬁlter
was included. However, the authors have not found enough informa-
tion on the response of HEPA ﬁlters without the carbon ﬁlter to those
species and therefore a conservative approach has been assumed,
whereby there is no retention for them. For noble gases, the internal
dose is not signiﬁcant and only external dose has to be considered.
However, for 131I in gas form, internal dose is important being 131I one
of the most signiﬁcant radionuclides. Given that we aim at taking a
conservative approach, and to ensure we lean towards the worst-case
scenario, also retention eﬃciency is set to zero for particulate matter.
Constant values of the radioactive cloud concentration, Co, have
been chosen for solving the concentration equation (1) inside the air-
craft.
In order to estimate the deposition of aerosol particles onto the
inside surfaces of the aircraft, the deposition rate, Xd, should be cal-
culated. For indoors, assuming a surface roughness similar to that of a
ﬁlter paper, the frictions velocities, u*, are between 20 and
60m h−1(Ahmed, 1979). According to diﬀerent studies (e.g.
Porstendörfer, 1994) the deposition velocities normalized by the fric-
tion velocity (u*) can be obtained from the relationship with the par-
ticle diameter. For example, a value of 4·10−4 for the ratio vg/u* is
obtained for an activity size diameter close to 1 μm and a surface
roughness similar to that of a ﬁlter paper. Therefore, an average de-
position velocity of about 0.02 m h−1 can be derived using
u* = 40 m h−1. Considering a large surface volume ratio in the aircraft
of about 10m-1, the average deposition rate, Xd, is then 0.2 h−1.
Taking the Airbus A320-200 as a generic aircraft with its dimen-
sions, the pressurized fuselage volume is about 330m3. For a unit
radionuclide concentration in the radioactive cloud, and using the
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aircraft characteristics, deposition and all the parameters as described
above to solve to Equation (1), the temporal evolution of the con-
centration inside the cabin reaches a stable value of about the half of
the outside concentration in a short period of time of less than 10min.
However, in a rough approximation and considering a cruise altitude
between 9 and 11 km a.s.l., it is considered that the air density inside
the cabin is approximately double than outside density, thus both will
have almost the same concentration per unit volume.
2.3. Calculation of the internal dose – Committed dose per unit intake
(DPUI)
The internal eﬀective dose, E in mSv, for a radionuclide i with a
concentration Ci (Bq m−3) inside the aircraft cabin for a time period
exposure of t hours and breathing rate of V˙ (m3 h−1) will be calculated
using the following equation:
=E DPUI C V t· · ˙ ·i i [2]
Provided that the concentration and the period that the passengers
are exposed to such concentrations and the breathing rate are known,
the committed dose per unit intake (DPUI in mSv per Bq) is used to
estimate the eﬀective dose as a function of the cloud concentration in
equation (2). DPUI values were obtained from ICRP publication 71
(ICRP, 1995). Recommended values in ICRP 71 of absorption into blood
and an activity mean aerodynamic diameter (AMAD) of 1 μm has been
considered. For the selected radionuclides, rounding DPUI for a 3-
months baby has been selected for conservative dose calculations since
for adults DPUI values are lower than for babies. In Table 2, DPUI va-
lues used for dose calculations are shown.
In the case of Tellurium, its chemical form can be both in gas and
vapor as well as in particulate aerosol. There is scarce information
about the behavior of tellurium in an accidental release. Therefore, its
daughter, the 132I, has been considered for the dose evaluation using its
corresponding systemic biokinetics. In this way, the DPUI for 132Te in
equilibrium with 132I has been considered and the gas form was chosen
in order to be conservative in the dose calculations.
2.4. Calculations of H*(10)
The ambient dose equivalent rate, ∗H˙ (10), in μSv/s is calculated
using the following equation:
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where.
ko is the conversion unit coeﬃcient 1.602 10−4 μGy per MeV g−1,
γ is the yield for the corresponding gamma decay of the radionuclide
in s−1 Bq−1, A is the activity in Bq,
ϕi is the ﬂuence per incident photon of energy i expressed in cm
−2,
Ei is the energy of the incident photon in MeV, (
μen/ρ)i is the mass energy transfer coeﬃcient for energy i in cm2/g
obtained from the NIST Standard Reference Database (Hubbell, JH.
and Seltzer, 2004), and
Fi is the conversion coeﬃcient from air-kerma into ambient dose
equivalent for energy bin i (ISO 4037-3, 1999) in μSv/μGy.
The ﬂuence energy distribution ϕi for a pre-deﬁned geometry is
calculated using the Monte Carlo code PENELOPE/PenEasy (Sempau
et al., 2011). PENELOPE (Salvat et al., 2011) is a code for the coupled
electron-photon transport in arbitrary materials in a wide energy range,
Table 1
List of radionuclides in an emergency radiological scenario and their main characteristics.
Radionuclide T1/2 Decay mode, energy (max, average for beta) in keV (probability*100)
137Cs 30.05 years β−: 514–174(94.36); 1176–416(5.64)
γ: 661.7(85)
134Cs 2.064 years β−: 89.06–23.2(27.27); 415.64–123.6(2.5); 658.39–210.3(70.19)
γ: 475.4(1.5); 563.25(8.34); 569.33(15.4); 604.72(97.63); 795.86(85.47); 801.85(8.694); 1038.65(0.99); 1168(1.791); 1365.19(3.019)
131I 8.0233 days β−: 247.9–69.35(2.13); 333.8–96.61(7.20); 606.3–191.59(89.4)
γ: 80.2(2.607); 284.305(6.14); 364.489(81.2); 636.989(7.12); 722.911(1.786)
132Te decays to 132I 3.230 days β−: 240–67.0(100)
γ: 49.72(15.1); 111.81(1.85); 116.34(1.97); 228.327(88.12)
132I 2.295 h β−: 742–242.7(13.0); 1186–422.1(19.0); 1618–608.1(12.3); 2141–841.8(19.0)
γ: 505.79(4.93); 522.65(16.0); 630.19(13.3); 667.714(98.7); 669.8(4.6); 671.4(3.5); 772.6(75.6); 812.0(5.5); 954.6(17.6); 1398.57(7.01)
88Kr 2.825 h Produced by 235U(n,F). Therefore, most of the activity will decay before it reaches the aerial space.
β−: 526–137.3(67); 686–228.5(9.1); 2919–1235.4(14)
γ:196.3(26.0); 834.83(13); 1529.77(10.9); 2195.84(13.2); 2392.11(34.6)
133Xe 5.2474 days β−: 346.4–100.6(99.12)
γ: 81(37.0)
135Xe 9.14 h β−: 915–320.2(96)
γ: 249.8 (90)
Fig. 1. Airﬂow inside a generic aircraft cabin (Lufthansa technical report,
https://www.lufthansa-technik.com.).
Table 2
Committed eﬀective doses per unit Bq intake in mSv Bq−1
for diﬀerent radionuclides and forms.
Radionuclide DPUI (mSv per Bq)
131I particle 7.00E-05
131I gas 1.50E-04
134Cs 1.20E-05
137Cs 1.00E-05
132Te+ 132I 5.00E-05
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spanning from a few hundred eV to about 1 GeV. The core of the pro-
gram is a set of Fortran subroutines. In this work, penEasy has been
adopted as the steering main program, which includes a set of source
models, tallies and variance-reduction techniques.
With PENELOPE/penEasy, the ﬂuence is calculated for diﬀerent
source geometries: i) gamma decays from radionuclides in a radioactive
cloud, ii) gamma decays from deposited particles on the outside walls of
the aircraft and iii) gamma decays from deposited particles on the in-
side walls of the aircraft.
Two main scenarios have been used to estimate the spectrum re-
sponse of a spectrometric detector installed inside the aircraft: a) the
aircraft is outside the cloud and b) the aircraft is inside the cloud.
The geometry used to calculate the ﬂuence energy distribution in-
side the aircraft has been simpliﬁed assuming that there is no at-
tenuation from the walls of the aircraft. This assumption overestimates
the dose and is used in order to calculate the doses for the worst-case
scenarios that are described in the next sections. This is in line with the
conservative approach taken in the paper.
2.5. Scenario preparation: atmospheric transport modeling for a nuclear
power plant accident
In order to perform the calculations of the estimated doses, a sce-
nario or a set of scenarios need to be deﬁned. To this aim, the
Fig. 2. 133Xe (left) and 137Cs (right) concentrations at 10.000m height on 18th March 2011 at 03h00 UTC.
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Lagrangian particle dispersion model FLEXPART (Stohl et al., 2005)
version 10 was used to simulate transport of radionuclides emitted from
the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant (NPP) accident and obtain
the 4D concentration ﬁelds of selected radionuclides. FLEXPART was
forced by European Center for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts
(ECMWF) operational meteorological analyses from the Integrated
Forecast System (IFS) with 137 model levels and a horizontal resolution
of 0.5°× 0.5°.
Emissions were adopted from Stohl et al. (2012) for 137Cs and 133Xe
for the period between 10 March 2011 at 12.00 and 20 April 2011 at
midnight following 3-hourly intervals (932 releases in total) over three
altitudes (0–50 m, 50–300 m and 300–1000 m). The model ran forward
in time emitting 300,000 particles per release, giving a total of about
279.6 million particles. The tracers 137Cs and 133Xe were used in the
FLEXPART set-up. It is also good to highlight that this source term is
known to be overestimating the source term, which is advantageous for
this study as it focuses on the worst-case scenario approach.
While xenon is a noble gas and it is not subject to scavenging pro-
cesses, caesium is almost entirely attached onto particle surfaces.
Therefore, the simulations for 137Cs accounted for wet and dry de-
position (Stohl et al., 2012), assuming a mean particle diameter of
0.4 μm used commonly for such simulations and a density of
1900 kgm−3 (Krinstiansen et al., 2016). The wet deposition scheme
considers below-cloud and in-cloud scavenging separately based on
cloud liquid water and cloud ice content, precipitation rate and cloud
depth from ECMWF, as described in Grythe et al. (2017). The dry de-
position scheme in FLEXPART is based on the resistance analogy (Slinn,
1982).
2.5.1. Worst-case scenarios in case of a NPP accident: Fukushima
Two scenarios have been deﬁned for the Fukushima NPP accident in
order to evaluate the radiological dose: i) Fictitious Cruise scenario - at
cruising speed and altitude. In this case a transoceanic ﬂight over the
Paciﬁc Ocean during the Fukushima accident has been evaluated and ii)
Fictitious Take-oﬀ/landing scenario - low altitude ﬂight when the aircraft
is in the taking oﬀ or landing operations. In this case, the aircraft is
located close to the Fukushima NPP, i.e., when and where concentra-
tions levels were extremely high.
2.5.1.1. Fictitious Cruise scenario - Transoceanic ﬂight during Fukushima
accident. For this scenario it was assumed that within travel time, 10 h,
the ﬂight encounters the radioactive cloud. The concentrations for 137Cs
and 133Xe were estimated from the simulation at a height of 10 km
above ground level. Although this does not correspond exactly to the
corresponding 300 hPa ﬂight level, it comes close enough to perform
the study without having to do the conversion to ﬂight levels.
The simulation (Fig. 2) shows that the concentration of 137Cs is
about three orders of magnitude lower than that of 133Xe at this height.
Given that the simulation has only been made for 137Cs and 133Xe, a
way to infer the concentrations of the remaining signiﬁcant radio-
nuclides is required. Based on the paper of Masson et al. (2011), the
following assumptions have been made: i) 134Cs concentration is similar
to 137Cs, ii) The concentration of 131I in particle form is about 10 times
higher than that of 137Cs iii) The ratio of particulate to gas form for 131I
is approximately 0.5, and iv) The ratio of 132Te concentration to 131I in
particle form is close to 2.5%.
88Kr and 135Xe decay very quickly and will not reach the atmo-
sphere in huge quantities for this scenario, therefore a concentration of
two orders of magnitude lower than 133Xe was assumed for the dose
calculations. This is in line with the work by IRSN (IRSN, 2011) on the
evaluation of the emissions till 22nd of March.
Based on the atmospheric transport simulations, a time period
where concentrations were high at high altitudes was selected to make
a conservative estimate of the integrated concentrations. No realistic
ﬂight tracks have been used. The portions of the time that the aircraft is
ﬂying inside the radioactive cloud with speciﬁc 133Xe concentrations
using the selected simulation snapshot are summarized in Table 3, to-
gether with the corresponding time integrated concentration. It is im-
portant to note that, within the EUNADICS-AV project, dose estimates,
based on derived source terms and atmospheric transport calculations
will be available on realistic ﬂight tracks. Table 4 shows the time in-
tegrated concentrations for each radionuclide and the average con-
centrations during the 10-h ﬂight.
2.5.1.2. Fictitious Take-oﬀ/landing scenario - Low altitude ﬂight. In this
scenario, it was assumed that the aircraft is ﬂying close to the ground
level over a period of 30min and within an area with radius 100 km
centered in the NPP, in order to consider the landing and taking oﬀ
operations close to the accident. The assumption of 30min for landing
and taking oﬀ operations is extremely conservative, even more,
considering that in an emergency situation as described, these
operations would be reduced to minimum time and probably will
take only a few minutes.
The radionuclide concentrations in this scenario have been obtained
based on the literature on the analysis of time series measurements
carried out close to the Fukushima NPP at ground level and simulations
using the FLEXPART model at 500m a.g.l.
The estimated release rates time-series of radionuclides from the
Fukushima NPP just after the accident are largely uncertain, because
only radiation dose rates and/or very limited data of atmospheric
radionuclides are available. In addition, atmospheric radionuclide
concentrations simulated by atmospheric transport models with an es-
timated source term have also large uncertainty, due to uncertainties in
the involved meteorological input data and the dispersion model itself
and above all they cannot be validated due to the lack of observational
data. Although the observed deposition densities of radionuclides on
the ground were used to estimate internal radiation doses in some cases,
the time integrated atmospheric radionuclide concentrations for quan-
tifying inhalation derived from these estimates have yet again large
uncertainties. Therefore, in the work of Hirayama et al. (2015), the
temporal evolution of the 131I concentration was estimated using
measured spectra from NaI(Tl) detectors. In this work, which has been
Table 3
Calculated time integrated concentrations according to 133Xe concentrations
obtained from Fig. 2.
Concentration (Bq m−3) Time exposure
(h)
Time integrated concentration (Bq
m−3 h)
700 0.083 58
500 0.167 83
100 0.25 25
50 0.5 25
10 2 20
5 3 15
1 4 4
TOTAL 10 185
Table 4
Time integrated concentration for each radionuclide and average concentration
for transoceanic ﬂight during Fukushima accident in a worst-case scenario.
Radionuclide Time integrated concentration
(Bq m−3 h)
Average concentration (Bq
m−3)
131I particle 1.85E+00 1.85E-01
131I gas 3.70E+00 3.70E-01
134Cs 1.85E-01 1.85E-02
137Cs 1.85E-01 1.85E-02
132Te+132I 4.63E-02 4.63E-03
88Kr 1.85E+00 1.85E-01
133Xe 1.85E+02 1.85E+01
135Xe 1.85E+00 1.85E-01
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used as a reference, the location of 13 measurement stations in the ci-
ties of Futuba, Okuma, Naraha, Tomioka, Hirono and Fukushima, their
time integrated and average 131I were estimated. According to data
obtained from this work (Hiramaya et al., 2015), an average 131I con-
centration in gas form of 10 kBq m−3 has been chosen for a ﬂight time
of half an hour during the landing or taking oﬀ operations. The ratio of
131I particulate to 131I gas is the same as for transoceanic ﬂight, i.e., 0.5,
given an average 131I concentration in particulate form of 5 kBq m−3.
In Fig. 3 simulations of the concentrations of 133Xe and 137Cs at
500m altitude are shown just after the accident. A ratio of about 200 is
estimated, which is lower than for the transoceanic ﬂight due to the
deposition of 137Cs. From the simulation 100 kBq m−3 and 500 Bq m−3
for 133Xe and 137Cs respectively have been chosen for a ﬂight time of
half an hour during the landing or taking oﬀ operations. The ratios of
133Xe to 137Cs and 137Cs–134Cs are the same as for transoceanic ﬂight.
The UNSCEAR 2013 report (UNSCEAR, 2013) has been used to es-
timate the ratio of 132Te to 137Cs concentrations in air. At the start of
the emission, the ratio of 132Te to 137Cs was around 10, which drasti-
cally decrease after a few days due to the diﬀerent decay half-life.
For 88Kr and 135Xe concentrations, due to their short lives, most of
these radionuclides will decay before it reaches the aerial space.
However, it has been anyway included with a concentration 10 times
lower than 133Xe (IRSN, 2011).
Table 5 shows the time integrated concentrations for a half hour
ﬂight and the average concentrations that are used for dose calcula-
tions.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Eﬀective dose estimation due to radionuclide inhalation
3.1.1. Fictitious cruising speed and altitude. Transoceanic ﬂight during
Fukushima accident at cruising speed and altitude
A breathing rate of 1 m3 h-1 for passengers and crew is assumed
according to the ICRP (ICRP, 1994) recommended values for resting
and light exercise. Table 6 shows the committed eﬀective dose for this
worst-case scenario using approximately values of DPUI coeﬃcients
given for a 3-month old baby.
3.1.2. Fictitious Take-oﬀ/landing scenario - Low altitude ﬂight
Table 6 shows the committed eﬀective dose for the worst-case sce-
nario. A total dose of 1.1mSv has been estimated from time integrated
concentrations of Table 5. This value is just above the annual 1mSv
ICRP (ICRP, 2007) reference level.
3.2. Ambient dose equivalent estimation
H*(10) have been calculated for i) immersion inside the radioactive
cloud, ii) deposited radionuclides inside aircraft walls and iii) depositedFig. 3.
133Xe and 137Cs concentrations at 500m height on 15th march 2011 at
03h00 UTC.
Table 5
Time integrated concentration for each radionuclide and average concentration
for low altitude ﬂight close to Fukushima just after the accident.
Radionuclide Time integrated concentration(Bq
m−3 h)
Average concentration(Bq
m−3)
131I particle 2.50E+03 5.00E+03
131I gas 5.00E+03 1.00E+04
134Cs 2.50E+02 5.00E+02
137Cs 2.50E+02 5.00E+02
132Te+132I 2.50E+03 5.00E+03
88Kr 5.00E+03 1.00E+04
133Xe 5.00E+04 1.00E+05
135Xe 5.00E+03 1.00E+04
Table 6
Committed eﬀective dose for a baby due to inhalation in the two scenarios
selected, namely, a worst-case transoceanic ﬂight and take-oﬀ and landing
operations both during Fukushima accident.
Radionuclide DPUI
(mSv per
Bq)
Time Integrated
concentration inside cabin
(Bq m−3 h)
E (mSv)
Transoceanic Takeoﬀ/
landing
Transoceanic Takeoﬀ/
landing
131I particle 7.00E-05 3.70E+00 2.50E+03 2.6E-04 1.8E-01
131I gas 1.50E-04 7.40E+00 5.00E+03 1.1E-03 8.0E-01
134Cs 1.20E-05 3.70E-01 2.50E+02 4.4E-06 3.0E-03
137Cs 1.00E-05 3.70E-01 2.50E+02 3.7E-06 3.0E-03
132Te+132I 5.00E-05 9.25E-02 2.50E+03 4.6E-06 1.3E-01
88Kr 0.00E+00 3.70E+00 5.00E+03 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
133Xe 0.00E+00 3.70E+02 5.00E+04 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
135Xe 0.00E+00 3.70E+00 5.00E+03 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
TOTAL 1.4E-03 1.1
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particles outside aircraft walls, and for both scenarios, i.e., during the
transoceanic ﬂight and during take oﬀ and land operations.
3.2.1. Fictitious Cruise scenario- Transoceanic ﬂight during Fukushima
accident
3.2.1.1. Immersion inside the radioactive cloud. It is assumed that the
passengers and crew are exposed for 10-h with no shielding due to the
aircraft walls. The exposure is estimated based on percentages of time
the snapshot of the FLEXPART simulations. The ﬂuence rates are
calculated using PENELOPE/penEasy code for a radioactive cloud size
of 10-km x 10-km x 3-km. The H*(10) rates are estimated using
equation (3), where A is the activity in the cloud in Bq, obtained
from the average concentration for each radionuclide (Table 4)
multiplied by the 300 km3 volume of the radioactive cloud. In
Table 7, the H*(10) rate per Bq m−3, the corresponding time
integrated concentration (Table 4), its contribution to H*(10) and the
total H*(10) are shown. The calculated total H*(10) of 22.7 nSv is not
signiﬁcant and negligible compared to the dose due to inhalation.
3.2.1.2. Deposited radionuclides inside aircraft walls. Following, a
simpliﬁed method to calculate the dose due to deposited radioactive
particles inside on the wall of the aircraft is carried out for 137Cs. First,
it should be considered that the deposited particles on the walls will
remain there unless a speciﬁc cleaning process is carried out.
Furthermore, after an aircraft has ﬂown inside a radioactive cloud
and landed, a control of its contamination will be carried out.
Therefore, in a conservative calculation, it can be assumed that the
integrated deposition rate on the walls occurred at the beginning of the
ﬂight and during that ﬂight time of 10-h the passengers and crew were
irradiated.
The deposited activity rate can be calculated with the equation:
⎜ ⎟= ⎛
⎝
⎞
⎠
A C
C
C v˙ 2dep
o
o dep
[4]
in Bq m−2 h, where.
C/Co is the ratio of the concentration inside the aircraft to the
concentration in the radioactive cloud and is obtaining by solving
equation [1]. No retention of the ﬁlter is considered for calculations, so,
C/Co is 1. The factor 2 is included to take into account the double
density inside the aircraft compared to outside, Co is the concentration
in the radioactive cloud in Bq m−3, vdep is the deposition velocity in m
h−1 (a value of 0.02m h−1 was estimated previously according to the
work of Porstendörfer, 1994).
In order to calculate the accumulated deposited activity:
∑=
=
A C i v Δt2 ( )dep
i
n
o dep i
1 [5]
in Bq m−2, where.
Co(i) is the concentration of the radionuclide in the cloud at time i in
Bq m−3.
Δti is the period of time with the concentration Co(i) in hours.
In order to calculate the external dose, it is assumed that the
radionuclide is completely deposited at time zero. For instance, for
137Cs, the time integrated concentration is 0.185 Bq m−3 h (Table 4).
Therefore, using equation (5), the accumulated deposited activity on
the walls is 7.4·10−3 Bq m−2.
The ﬂuence distribution for deposited 137Cs activity has been cal-
culated using PENELOPE/penEasy for a cylindrical tube of 4-m dia-
meter and 40-m length representing the A320 aircraft. The calculated
conversion coeﬃcient for 137Cs is 1.67 nSv h−1 per kBq m−2. Assuming
a 10-h ﬂight the total H*(10) is 1.2 10−4 nSv (1.67 nSv h−1 per kBq
m−2 x 7.4·10−6 kBq m−2 x10 h). Therefore, doses from the walls are
not further considered in the analysis.
3.2.1.3. Deposited particles outside aircraft walls. Deposited particles on
the outside walls of the aircraft are complicated to evaluate since the
attached fraction of particles is not known. In any case, the H*(10) rate
conversion factor per unit deposited activity will be lower than for the
inside walls because of the wall attenuation. In order to calculate the
outside deposited particles on the aircraft walls, an extremely
conservative calculation can be carried out assuming that all particles
where the aircraft passes through, when is inside the radioactive cloud,
are deposited on the aircraft the wall. The traveling distance is assumed
to be 8000 km with an equivalent concentration of 18.5 mBq m−3 for
137Cs. Considering an aircraft diameter of 4m, the volume the aircraft
passes through is about 1.0 108m3. Therefore, assuming that all the
activity in this volume is deposited on the aircraft walls, led to a
maximum deposited activity of 1850 kBq. Then, assuming the aircraft
as a cylinder of 4-m diameter and 40-m length, the activity per unit
surface is about 3.7 kBq m−2. Using the dose conversion coeﬃcient
1.67 nSv h−1 per kBq m−2, the total H*(10) for 137Cs for this scenario
assuming 10 h exposure is about 62 nSv. Therefore, the dose
contribution from outside walls can also be neglected.
3.2.2. Take-oﬀ/landing scenario - Low altitude ﬂight
3.2.2.1. Immersion inside the radioactive cloud. H*(10) rate is calculated
in a similar way as for the transoceanic ﬂight but using the
corresponding time integrated concentrations. Table 7 shows that the
external dose is about 40 μSv, which is considered not to be relevant
from the radiological point of view under the current recommendations
from the ICRP for the general public exposure.
3.2.2.2. Deposited radionuclides inside aircraft walls. Following the same
procedure as for transoceanic ﬂight the dose from 137Cs is about
8.4·10−2 nSv. Therefore, the total contribution from this source can
be neglected.
3.2.2.3. Deposited particles outside aircraft walls. In this case the
deposited particles on the outside aircraft walls are estimated
according a ﬂight within a radius of 100 km around the NPP.
Therefore the volume of the ﬂight is 1.3 106m3. The average activity
during this ﬂight period is 0.5 kBq m−3. This led to a deposited activity
of 6.4 10 2 kBq and an activity per unit area of 1.3 kBq m−2. Using the
dose conversion coeﬃcient 1.67 nSv h−1 per kBq m−2, the total H*(10)
rate for 137Cs in the worse scenario is about 20 nSv. Therefore, the dose
contribution from outside walls can again be neglected.
4. Monitoring in aircrafts: is this the next step?
The installation of radiation detectors inside the cabin has three
Table 7
H*(10) due to immersion in an inﬁnite cloud in the worst-case scenario for
transoceanic and take-oﬀ operations.
Radionuclide H*(10)
(nSv h−1
per Bq
m−3)
Time Integrated
concentration (Bq m−3 h)
H*(10)
(mSv)
Transoceanic Takeoﬀ/
landing
Transoceanic Takeoﬀ/
landing
131I particle 4.90E-01 1.85E+00 2.50E+03 0.9E-06 1.2E-03
131I gas 4.90E-01 3.70E+00 5.00E+03 1.8E-06 2.5E-03
134Cs 2.50E+00 1.85E-01 2.50E+02 0.5E-06 0.6E-03
137Cs 8.46E-01 1.85E-01 2.50E+02 0.2E-06 0.2E-03
132I 3.80E+00 4.63E-02 2.50E+03 0.2E-06 9.5E-03
132Te 3.71E-01 4.63E-02 2.50E+03 0.0E+00 0.9E-03
88Kr 3.67E+00 1.85E+00 5.00E+03 6.8E-06 18.4E-
03
133Xe 6.24E-02 1.85E+02 5.00E+04 11.5 E−06 3.1E-03
135Xe 4.28E-01 1.85E+00 5.00E+03 0.8E-06 2.1E-03
TOTAL 22.7E-06 38.6E-
03
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objectives i) to estimate the dose ii) to provide information to pilots as
well as others, on the ground in real time, to support decision, maybe
included in the Aircraft Meteorological Data Relay (AMDAR) observing
system (WMO, 2003) and iii) to provide data to be included in atmo-
spheric transport models (ATM) in order to improve the simulation
using data assimilation techniques.
Two types of detectors can be installed inside the cabin: i) air
sampling monitors for radioactive gases and aerosol and ii) devices for
monitoring the external dose rate. In the latter case, the use of spec-
trometric detectors using scintillators is recommended due to their
large use in environmental surveillance, low response to cosmic ra-
diation and the possibility to identify the radionuclides in the radio-
active cloud. In the following the spectrometric option is explored be-
cause they can be installed in the aircraft easily than air sampling units.
Furthermore, they are relatively light compared to iodine or aerosol
monitors and easier to manage. They do not need pumps and ﬁlters and
usually they are prepared to be used for relative long periods of time
using batteries.
A spectrometric detector to be installed in an aircraft should be
robust and not sensitive to vibrations. Furthermore, it should be pointed
out that in case radioactive aerosols reach the cabin, the deposited
particles on the surface of the detector itself could make a signiﬁcant
contribution to the measured spectra (Kessler et al., 2017) but not
contribute to the dose to passengers and crew, and would thus produce
an overestimation of the radioactive aerosol concentration in the cloud.
It is recommended to cover the detector with a thin plastic ﬁlm and
change the ﬁlm periodically in order to avoid the contribution of par-
ticles deposited on the surface of the monitor.Example of a detector that
could be installed in an aircraft is a 3″ diameter x 12″ length NaI de-
tector. The NaI crystal size of about 1.5 L (3″ diameter x 12” length) is
considered one of the biggest portable spectrometric monitors. Fur-
thermore, comparing it with the huge ones of 8 or 16 L is easier to be
installed inside an aircraft.
The response of this detector due to a radioactive cloud of 10-km x
10-km x 3-km length is analysed. In order to calculate the response of
the detector in the energy bin i, Ri in cps per kBqm−3, the following
expression is used:
∑=
=
R ϕ p V γi
j i
n
j i j,
[6]
Where.
ϕj is the ﬂuence per emitted photon in the cloud of energy j in cm
−2.
The ﬂuence is obtained using Monte Carlo (MC) simulations.
pi,j is the detector eﬃciency at energy bin i per unit ﬂuence for an
incident gamma ﬂux of energy bin j, expressed in cm2. For i= j, the pj,j
values are the photo-peak eﬃciencies (εj). The detector eﬃciencies are
calculated by MC simulations with parallel photon ﬂuences perpendi-
cular to the vertical axis of the monitor in 1/eV (for example 4.86 10−4
1/eV for 660 keV). The surface of the parallel beam, Sf, is 232.26 cm2
(3″x12″). The simulations are carried out with an energy bin of 1 keV.
For example, εj for i=660 keV is:
= = =−ε MC ΔE S cm4.86 10 10 232.26 112.9output bin f660 4 3 2 [7]
V is the volume of the radioactive cloud in m3, in this case, the
volume is 3 1011 m3.
γ is the yield for the corresponding gamma decay of the radio-
nuclide in s−1 Bq−1.
In Table 8, the response of the detector located in the center of the
radioactive cloud and at 6-km from the center of the cloud, i.e., 1-km
distance from the border of the cloud for diﬀerent radionuclides is
shown. The response of the detector to the radioactive cloud will be
mainly due to scattering photons. This eﬀect can be seen in the calcu-
lated ratios of the photo-peak to total counts which are less than 1%
when the aircraft is located 1-km far away of the cloud and about 10%
when the aircraft is inside the cloud. In future studies, this eﬀect could
be used in order to know if the aircraft is inside or outside the radio-
active cloud.
In order to complete the study of the 3″x12″ NaI detector response,
simulated spectra have been calculated when the aircraft is ﬂying at
cruise altitude. In order to obtain a realistic spectrum in case of an
accident a measurement campaign with an Embraer Legacy 600 aircraft
has been carried out at 12 km altitude over the aerial space of Prague.
These spectra are called background and their main contribution is due
to the cosmic radiation. A typical 1 s measured spectrum is shown in
Fig. 4 (blue line). A description of the cosmic radiation can be found
elsewhere such as in the UNSCEAR 2008 report (UNSCEAR, 2008).
Whereas at ground level the main cosmic contribution to the dose is the
muon component (about 0.03 μSv h−1), at cruise aircraft altitudes
neutrons, electrons, positrons, photons and protons are the most sig-
niﬁcant contributors to the dose (about 4 μSv h−1). However, it should
be pointed out that scintillator detectors are mainly sensitive only to the
photon component, which represents less than the 25% of the total dose
at ﬂight altitude (UNSCEAR, 2008).
The simulation has been carried out according to 1 Bq m−3 for 137Cs
and 134Cs, 30 Bq m−3 for 131I and 1 kBqm−3 for 133Xe according to
values for the ﬂight over the ocean during the Fukushima accident.
The simulation for a 1 s spectrum is shown in Fig. 4. It can be seen
that the most predominant peak is the one from 133Xe. However, due to
its low energy some attenuation is expected in a real situation since the
walls of the aircraft have not been considered in the simulations. It can
be noted that in the background spectrum, the pair production peak at
511 keV can be seen and could be used to re-calculate the energy ca-
libration curve. The energy resolution according to the full width at half
maximum (FWHM) was calculated using diﬀerent radionuclide sources
and following the expression suggested in Knoll (1998):
=FWHM E2.33 [8]
Where E is the energy in keV.
5. Conclusions for traﬃc management and recommendations for
the aviation sector
The probability that a catastrophic nuclear accident similar to the
Fukushima Dai-ichi accident would produce signiﬁcant doses to the
passengers and crew of an aircraft is very low based on the worst-case
scenarios designed for this event. During the ﬂight, at cruise altitude,
the calculated doses are much lower than the reference value of 1mSv
for the public. During ﬂights near the accident location the doses can
come close to the reference levels. In this instance, network monitors on
ground and close to the NPP location provide information on the
radiological risk to decision makers in order to decide on re-
commendations due to the radiological incident. The exclusion zone
could be extrapolated vertically, to determine a no-ﬂy zone, as hap-
pened during the Fukushima accident, when the Japanese government
declared an exclusion zone of 30 km radius around the NPP as a no-ﬂy
zone (IAEA, 2011). One of the most important complications to make
any assessment is the lack of measurements other than at ground levels.
A spectrometric detector installed in the aircraft can provide an esti-
mation of the activity concentration in the radioactive cloud. This in-
formation can be useful to be assimilated in the atmospheric transport
models in order to improve the simulations of the radioactive cloud
dispersion in the atmosphere. Furthermore, this detector can provide
the H*(10) rate to the passengers and crew can as well be useful to
provide a rough estimate of the internal dose. However, surfaces, ﬁlters
and other objects of the aircraft can become contaminated and a de-
contamination procedure and handling must be established after the
aircraft lands. This contamination can be minimized if the aircraft has
radioactive monitoring systems installed and the route is modiﬁed to
avoid the radioactive cloud in combination with the atmospheric
transport modeling tools and the agreed reference levels on potential
risk that would provide useable charts for dispatchers and pilots.
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It is important to stress that this work is a ﬁrst step to be pursued
further in the future and that it does not include any operational as-
pects. In particular, should the option of including monitoring devices
in commercial aircrafts be realized, additional in depth discussions with
the diﬀerent stakeholders, manufacturers and policy makers should
take place starting a lengthy process from concept to actual im-
plementation and usage. It is also to be noted, that this very preliminary
work does not include a full assessment of all the uncertainties existing,
ranging from those related to the measurements, the dose simulations
and the atmospheric transport modeling, being the latter one critical
and of utmost importance since it links to the usually limited knowl-
edge of the actual type and amount of radionuclides released into the
atmosphere. Such uncertainties support once more the conservative
approximation taken with focus on a worst-case scenario. In future
work, an uncertainty range could be estimated, for example, by using
ensemble modeling approaches both for the source term and the me-
teorological and atmospheric transport models used in addition to a
more quantitative assessment of the uncertainties from the measure-
ment side.
Lastly, although the doses estimated in this study are small, having
proper estimate of the radioactive cloud either with atmospheric
transport modeling, measurements or, ideally, a combination of both,
would enable following the ALARA criteria and the pilot could reroute
accordingly.
This work is seen as a starting point to potential follow-up activities
that could comprise:
1. Further investigation based on a simulation scenario with a ﬁcti-
tious, but known emission, realistic ﬂight tracks and with synthetic
measurements at ground levels and the assumption that each air-
craft would include a radiological spectrometric detector. The re-
sponse of that ﬂeet of detectors should then be simulated to identify
what actual information they would provide in such an event and
how this information could be used.
2. Study, based on 1, how the decision process could be improved
through a) better information to decision makers. This should in-
clude a set of forecast charts at ﬂight altitudes showing the amount
of radioactivity and the deﬁnition of operational intervention levels,
and b) inclusion of those measurement in simulation activities that
would allow a better understanding of the extend and evolution of
the radioactive cloud especially by aircraft measurements.
3. Last, but not least, investigation of the option for citizen science,
taking into account the possibility of smartphones with embedded
gamma dose rate monitors which would de facto translate in the
order of hundreds of detectors in a plane.
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